

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Kevin Harris,)	C/A No.: 1:19-1483-DCC-SVH
)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	
vs.)	
)	ORDER AND NOTICE
Captain Marvin Nix and Sheriff)	
Rick Clark,)	
)	
Defendants.)	
)	

Kevin Harris (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his Eighth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee at Pickens County Detention Center (“PCDC”) and brings this action against PCDC captain Marvin Nix (“Nix”) and Pickens County Sheriff Rick Clark (“Clark”) in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff challenges the conditions of his confinement at PCDC, including alleged exposure to black mold, overcrowding, no access to a law library, inability to have a private conversation with his attorney, clogged

shower drains, and denial of access to mental health care. [*See* ECF No. 1 at 5–7, 9–10]. Plaintiff asserts he has lower back pain from sleeping on the floor, shortness of breath due to black mold, and an eye injury from slipping in a clogged shower. *Id.* at 12. He seeks monetary damages. *Id.* at 13.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). *See Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).

Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. *Gordon v. Leeke*, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's

allegations are assumed to be true. *Fine v. City of N.Y.*, 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. *Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 901 F.2d 387, 390–91 (4th Cir. 1990).

B. Analysis

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. *See Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009); *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint’s factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678–79.

To state a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an aggrieved party must sufficiently allege he was injured by “the deprivation of any [of his

or her] rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [United States] Constitution and laws” by a “person” acting “under color of state law.” *See* 42 U.S.C. § 1983; *see generally* 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, *Federal Practice and Procedure* § 1230 (3d ed. 2014).

1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment provides, “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. The United States Supreme Court has long held the Eleventh Amendment also precludes suits against a state by one of its own citizens. *See Edelman v. Jordan*, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). This immunity extends not only to suits against a state per se, but also to suits against agents and instrumentalities of the state. *Cash v. Granville Cnty. Bd. of Ed.*, 242 F.3d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 2001).

Because the defendants in this case are employees of a South Carolina county, when acting in their official capacities, they are considered an arm of the state and not a “person” within the meaning § 1983. *See Pennington v. Kershaw Cnty., S.C.*, No. 3:12-1509-JFA-SVH, 2013 WL 2423120, at *4 (D.S.C. June 4, 2013) (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 4-1-10 and applying the Eleventh Amendment to a county as “a political subdivision of the State”); *Chisolm v. Cannon*, C/A No. 4:02-3473-RBH, 2006 WL 361375, at *5–6 (D.S.C. Feb. 15,

2006) (finding Charleston County Detention Center entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as an arm of the state); *Cone v. Nettles*, 417 S.E.2d 523, 525 (S.C. 1992) (employees of a county Sheriff are state officials); *see also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police*, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[N]either a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”).

A state cannot, without its consent, be sued in a district court of the United States by one of its own citizens upon the claim that the case is one arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. *Edelman*, 415 U.S. at 663. The State of South Carolina has not consented to be sued in this case, *see* S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e); thus, as arms of the state, the named defendants, in their official capacities, are immune from Plaintiff’s claims for damages.

2. Conditions of Confinement

Plaintiff alleges violations of his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment due to various conditions of his confinement. Because Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee, this right stems from and is properly evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment. *Bell v. Wolfish*, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 537 n.16 (1979); *Martin v. Gentile*, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are at least as great as Eighth Amendment protections available to prisoners. *Martin*, 849 F.2d at 870.

To state a claim that conditions of confinement violate constitutional requirements, “a plaintiff must show both (1) a serious deprivation of a basic human need; and (2) deliberate indifference to prison conditions on the part of prison officials.” *Strickler v. Waters*, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993). To demonstrate that the conditions deprived him of a basic human need, a plaintiff must allege that officials failed to provide him with humane conditions of confinement, such as “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and [taking] reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). As to the second prong, a prison official is deliberately indifferent if he has actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to a prisoner and disregards that substantial risk. *Id.* at 847; *see also Parrish v. Cleveland*, 372 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating the standard of deliberate indifference requires actual knowledge and disregard of a substantial risk of serious injury).

Further, a plaintiff asserting unconstitutional conditions of confinement must demonstrate that he suffered a serious or significant physical or mental injury as a result of the challenged condition. *See Strickler*, 989 F.2d at 1380–81. “No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).

Plaintiff's complaint fails to allege facts suggesting deliberate indifference by either Nix or Clark.

3. Supervisory Liability

Plaintiff alleges the defendants are liable not through their own actions, but because of their authority over PCDC staff. The doctrine of supervisory liability is generally inapplicable to § 1983 suits, such that an employer or supervisor is not liable for the acts of his employees, absent an official policy or custom that results in illegal action. *See Monell v. Department of Social Services*, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); *Fisher v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Authority*, 690 F.2d 1133, 1142–43 (4th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court explains that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to *Bivens* and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 676; *see Slakan v. Porter*, 737 F.2d 368, 372–74 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding officials may be held liable for the acts of their subordinates, if the official is aware of a pervasive, unreasonable risk of harm from a specified source and fails to take corrective action as a result of deliberate indifference or tacit authorization).

Plaintiff has not alleged an official policy or custom resulting in the alleged constitutional violations or that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to a pervasive, unreasonable risk of harm.

4. Denial of Mental Health Care

Plaintiff's complaints regarding a lack of response to his requests for mental health care could be construed as claims of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. However, Plaintiff fails to allege an affirmative link between an alleged constitutional violation and a particular public official. *See Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (providing that a plaintiff in a § 1983 action must plead that the defendant, through his own individual actions, violated the Constitution); *Rizzo v. Goode*, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72 (1976) (finding a § 1983 plaintiff must show that he suffered a specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant, and an affirmative link between the injury and that conduct).

Accordingly, Plaintiff's complaint is subject to summary dismissal for failure to plead sufficient facts to state viable constitutional claims.


NOTICE CONCERNING AMENDMENT

Plaintiff may attempt to correct the defects in his complaint by filing an amended complaint by June 12, 2019, along with any appropriate service documents. Plaintiff is reminded an amended complaint replaces the original complaint and should be complete in itself. *See Young v. City of Mount Ranier*, 238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001) ("As a general rule, an amended pleading ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If Plaintiff files an amended complaint,

the undersigned will conduct screening of the amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint or fails to cure the deficiencies identified above, the undersigned will recommend to the district court that the claims be dismissed without leave for further amendment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

May 22, 2019
Columbia, South Carolina

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Shiva V. Hodges". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Shiva V. Hodges
United States Magistrate Judge